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Employment Research
effects in lowering overall business costs.
Third, a significant proportion of the tax
credits are capped, which means that
on the margin these tax credits do not
lower the costs of expanding Washington
employment. Fourth, a significant
proportion of the tax credits are awarded
to non-export-based firms, which will
have lower effects on overall Washington
employment.
These explanations point to ways
to lower the cost per job created from
this policy. In particular, targeting
export-based firms with high multiplier
effects, and making sure that incentives
affect marginal costs to firms that are
expanding, will help reduce the cost per
job created. Higher multiplier effects
will be more likely if firms have stronger
local supplier links. Finally, if the goal is
job creation, directly tying the magnitude
of the incentive to job creation provides a
greater reason for firms to respond to the
incentive with job creation.
Notes
1. Dr. Raymond Wolfe of the NSF
graciously assisted us in navigating the NSF
data, and released the 2008 and 2009 data
slightly early.
2. Note that many firms’ marginal credit
ratio is 0, so that no simulated job creation
occurs at these firms.
3. The fact that wages increased less than
employment suggests that the credit had a
negative impact on wages per employee. This
finding is not surprising because one would
assume that new hires make, on average,
less than incumbent workers. In addition,
lower-wage firms may have higher percentage
effects of the tax credit on costs.
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I

n sectors where full-time schedules
do not dominate, total hours matter
greatly for job quality. We explore hour
levels and trends in retail trade, which is
known for part-time work. We compare
the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
taking advantage of the fact that work
hours regulations vary cross-nationally.
By comparing retail hour levels and
trends, we contribute insights into policy
and regulatory impacts on job quality.
Our analysis draws mainly on publicly
available data from national statistical
offices in the three countries; from 419

U.S. retail relies heavily on parttime workers, who increasingly
are guaranteed very few weekly
hours, but are expected to “flex
up” to 40 hours on demand.
field interviews with retail executives,
managers, and workers in the United
States and Mexico; and from secondary
sources.
Retail Hours—Cause for
Policy Concern
The issue of insufficient hours is
ubiquitous in U.S. retail. Schedules
are driven by retailers’ extension of
opening hours, and by wide swings in
shopping flows throughout the day and
week, as well as seasonally. Retail in the
United States relies heavily on part-time
workers, who increasingly are guaranteed
very few weekly hours, but are expected
to “flex up” to 40 hours on demand.
Moreover, today even the full-time-hours
guarantee falls below 40 hours, and often
below 35.

These patterns have significant
implications for the workforce. Lower
standard hours reduce the base level of
weekly earnings that workers—full- and
part-time—can rely upon. Additionally,
retailers’ scheduling practices generate
variability and unpredictability in
individuals’ total hours and in the
distribution of these hours. Part-timers
receive few or no benefits and usually
a lower hourly wage than full-time
workers. For these reasons, retail
work hours and the firm strategies and
institutional factors that drive them
warrant attention.
In each of the countries we examined,
long and expanding hours of operation
create two managerial goals: 1) control
labor costs with lean staffing, and 2)
closely match staffing levels to customer
flow. However, in the United States and
Canada, these twin goals lead retailers to
shorten employee work hours and expand
part-time jobs, whereas in Mexico they
lead retailers to lengthen hours.
The three countries provide a useful
comparison. They are neighbors and
share many of the same retail chains—
Wal-Mart is the largest retailer in both
the United States and Mexico and is one
of the top retailers in Canada as well. Yet
the labor market and social protection
institutions of the three countries are
quite distinct, with important implications
for hours of work.
Contrasting Hours in Canada,
the United States, and Mexico
We find differing levels and trends in
retail hours across the three countries in
recent decades. Table 1 provides average
weekly hours levels; data are broadly
comparable multiyear averages (see
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Carré and Tilly [2012a] for sources and
definitions). Compared to the economywide average, U.S. and Canadian retail
employees work shorter hours, while
Mexican retail workers put in longer
hours.
The United States has the shortest
average hours—they are shorter than in
Canada except in the grocery subsector.
Mexico has the longest hours economywide, and even longer hours in retail.
Mexican statistics must be seen within
the national context: our fieldwork
indicates that Mexican retailers press
workers to work unpaid additional
hours. In the United States, supervisors,
who are not subject to the overtime
premium, work much longer hours than
nonsupervisory workers; in Mexico,
the reverse is true, consistent with a
management regime built on extending
worker hours.
In Canada and the United States,
1987–2009 time trends for employee
hours are negative for total, retail, and

In the United States, supervisors
work much longer hours than
nonsupervisory workers; in
Mexico, the reverse is true.
grocery employment, but the negative
time trend is more marked in Canada
than in the United States: a loss of 1.8
hours over 20 years after controlling
for cyclical effects, as compared to the
0.2 hour U.S. loss (see Carré and Tilly
[2012b] for details).1 We lack detailed
time series data on Mexico and thus did
not make a parallel estimate of trends.
How Institutional Environment
Matters: Three Patterns
Patterns of hours reflect sector-specific
strategies but also significant differences
in institutional environments—notably
between Mexico and its two northern
neighbors, but also to some degree
between the United States and Canada.
Retailers have parallel practices in
Canada and the United States; they
control unit labor costs by paying lower
hourly wages and in most cases extending
fewer benefits to part-time workers
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than to full-time workers. Still, these
practices take place against a backdrop
of institutional characteristics with
significantly different implications. The
U.S. institutional environment for retail
jobs is best characterized as regulatory
“flexibility.” Retail hours of operation
are not regulated at the federal and state
levels; there are few (and diminishing)
local statutory limits on opening hours.
Retail entry-level wages are pegged at or
slightly above the minimum wage, which
is low relative to the economy-wide
median and has declined in real terms.
Collective bargaining, which historically
has improved compensation, covers a
declining share of workers (reaching 5
percent in retail and 17 percent in grocery
in 2011).
Canada’s institutional environment
represents a form of “constrained
flexibility.” Its industry regulation is
broadly similar to that of the United
States, but it has different norms in
regard to labor standards and social
protection. As provinces have relaxed
their restrictions on Sunday and holiday
opening, legal regulation of opening
hours has moved in the same direction as
in the United States, but it has changed
more recently in Canada. The steeper
1987–2009 decline in hours in Canada
reflects adoption of these practices in

Canadian retail starting in the 1980s,
then accelerating in the 1990s, whereas
these same practices had been longstanding in the United States by the late
1980s. Furthermore, in grocery retail
and general merchandise, severe price
competition also hit later. When it did, in
the early 1990s, management in Canadian
unionized grocery chains sought to
reopen contracts, dissolve pattern
bargaining, and redesign jobs (Kainer
2002). These changes, entailing greater
use of part-time workers, spread quickly.
Today Canadian retail has high rates of

Retailers in Canada and the
United States control unit labor
costs by paying lower hourly
wages and extending fewer
benefits to part-time workers.
part-time workers (35.5 percent of wage
employment in 2004, compared to 28
percent in the United States, although
Canada uses a lower threshold, 30 hours).
Still, even by 2007, the end of our
study period, Canadian retail hours
were on the whole higher than in the
United States, and the implications for
workers were mitigated. Very shorthour part-time work (less than 20 hours)
appears to be less prevalent in Canada.

Table 1 Average Weekly Hours for the United States, Canada, and Mexico
(multiyear averages)
U.S.
Canada Mexico
Total
All private, nonsupervisory, 1987–2009
34.13
Total, all employees, 1987–2009
36.69
All private, all employees, 1998/2003/2008
(Economic Census)
47.66
Retail
Nonsupervisory, 1987–2009
30.65
All employees, 1987–2009
33.04
All employees, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census)
51.57
Nonsupervisory, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census)
51.94
Grocery
Nonsupervisory, 1990–2009
31.08
All employees, 1990–2009
30.50
All employees, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census)
54.88
NOTE: Hours from Mexico’s Economic Census imputed by assuming 52 weeks of work a year,
thus weekly hours may be underestimated.
SOURCE: Carré and Tilly (2012b).
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Moreover, the impacts of part-time
work are buffered by nearly universal
access to health insurance. Differential
treatment does remain because several
employer-based benefits are not readily
available to part-time workers—namely
employer pensions, paid time off, and
supplemental health insurance—but
the cost advantage to retailers of parttime employment is reduced in Canada.
Finally, Canadian retail has retained
significant rates of collective bargaining
coverage, boosting compensation. In
2004, union coverage amounted to 15
percent of retail employment and 42
percent in grocery (compared to 6 and 18
percent, respectively, in the United States
that year). In recent years, provincial
minimum wage levels have remained
higher, relative to the average wage, than
the U.S. federal minimum wage.
In contrast, the institutional structure
regulating Mexican retail jobs can be
characterized as “unevenly regulated
dualism.” While much of the retail
industry in Mexico takes place in
informal and family businesses, which
typically evade regulation, the country
has a growing number of modern retail
outlets, including hypermarkets. Formal
retail businesses face a regulatory regime
quite distinct from that in the other two
countries.
Mexican institutions motivate
employers—especially retailers—to
set longer hours. Four elements of the
institutional environment of larger
stores have a particular impact: 1)
a long workweek, 2) the day-based
minimum wage, 3) universal social
insurance, and 4) weak unions and
limited enforcement. Mexico’s full-time
workweek is 48 hours (six days times
eight hours), with overtime provisions
only applying beyond this point. The
minimum wage there is set by daily pay
and not hourly pay. Mexican law also
mandates universal social insurance
(through employer contributions), though
the level is low and workers with greater
market power generally get plans above
the minimum. The first three provisions
weaken the incentive to use part-time
employment: 1) the 48-hour workweek
facilitates covering weekends without
part-timers, 2) the minimum wage sets
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a daily pay floor that vitiates the cost
advantage of short-hour workers if the
wage level is close to the minimum,
and 3) universal social insurance bars
(at least as a matter of law) a strategy
of excluding part-timers from the most
expensive benefits. The daily wage,
however, also sets an economic incentive
to push workers to work unpaid hours
beyond the statutory eight hours. Finally,
the bulk of retail unions negotiate socalled “protection” contracts (whereby
corrupt union leadership colludes with
management) that offer workers little if
any representation or recourse against
standards violations.
In short, national institutional
environments can shape employer
incentives and thus worker hours with
significant job quality implications. The
Canadian and Mexican examples suggest
possible U.S. policy options to mitigate

The institutional structure
regulating Mexican retail
jobs can be characterized as
“unevenly regulated dualism.”
the problems of short and variable
hours—for example, instituting a daily
as well as an hourly minimum wage
would reduce employers’ incentives to
create very short shifts (in a number of
states, recently instituted “reporting pay”
requirements that ensure a minimum
pay when called into work should have
similar effects); so would policies that
reduce the cost differentials between fulltime and part-time workers. Given the
importance of work hours as a job quality
indicator in retail and other service
work, these possibilities merit further
exploration.
Notes
This research was funded through an
Upjohn Policy grant. We thank the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for providing funding for
this research. For earlier and parallel research
that also contributed to this work, we thank
the Russell Sage Foundation, the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the
Fulbright Program. Special thanks to Diana
Denham and Brandynn Holgate for excellent
research assistance.

1. In the grocery subsector, time trend
begins in 1990.
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